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LEVEL II

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

Report To The Honorable
Sam Nunn
Member, Committee On Armed Services
OF THE UNITED STATES

Recruiting Malpractice: Extent, Causes, And Potentials For Improvement.

Malpractice is perceived by many recruiting personnel to be a problem, mostly in the Active Force components, particularly the Marine Corps. Types of malpractice thought to be occurring range from violating minor administrative regulations to downplaying of arrest records and drug problems and misleading of applicants about the military service.

Most instances of malpractice are attributed to pressure to meet difficult quotas. Recruiting personnel believe that the lessening of unnecessary administrative and processing responsibilities would be the most effective action to counter malpractice.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the services to periodically measure, on an anonymous basis, the incidents and causes of recruiting malpractice and should use the results of these surveys in making oversight reviews.

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON D.C 20548

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The Honorable Sam Nunn
Member, Committee on
  Armed Services
United States Senate

Dear Senator Nunn:

In response to your request, while Chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, we are submitting our report "Recruiting Malpractice: Extent, Causes, and Potentials for Improvement." This report is the final report in a series of reports to the Subcommittee.

At your request, we did not obtain official comments from the Department of Defense. The report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Sincerely yours,

Acting Comptroller General
of the United States

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT
TO THE HONORABLE SAM NUNN
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE

RECRUITING MALPRACTICE:
EXTENT, CAUSES, AND
POTENTIALS FOR IMPROVEMENT

D I G E S T

This report is based on a questionnaire survey
of Armed Forces recruiting personnel in all
services--Active, National Guard, and Reserve.
Survey results show the perceptions of recruit-
ers, noncommissioned officer supervisors, and
commanding officers on

--the extent of malpractice within the respec-
  tive service recruiting programs;

--possible causes for these actions; and

--probable corrective actions.

GAO made this study in response to a request of
Senator Sam Nunn, while Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Committee
on Armed Services, who was concerned about the
adequacy of service actions to control malprac-
tice. Investigations in 1978 and 1979 deter-
mined that recruiting malpractice problems did
occur in the Marine Corps and the Army.

Overall, GAO surveyed personnel in seven sepa-
rate recruiting programs. The highest perceived
level of malpractice is within the Marine Corps
program, followed in descending order by the
Army, Army National Guard, Navy, Air Force, Air
Force Reserve, and Air National Guard.

TYPES OF MALPRACTICE

Of the 25 specific types of malpractice (see
app. I, question 15) GAO studied, service per-
sonnel perceived the following as the most re-
curring:

Marine Corps--(1) inadequate or improper high
school graduation verification, (2) counseling

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to downplay the seriousness of, or to deny, police or arrest records, (3) counseling to downplay the seriousness of, or to not report, medical problems, (4) misleading applicants about service conditions or benefits, (5) misleading applicants about which assignments or schools are available or for which they are qualified, and (6) incorrect recording of the number of school years completed. (See pp. 6 to 9.)

Army--misleading applicants about service conditions or benefits. (See pp. 9 to 11.)

Navy--counseling to downplay or deny drug usage. (See pp. 11 to 13.)

Air Force--overly sympathetic waivers for police records and no verification of police records. (See pp. 12 and 15 to 19.)

REASONS FOR MALPRACTICE

Most respondents believed that the major reason for malpractice was difficult goals or quotas. The desire to help applicants was the next most frequent reason given. (See pp. 17 to 18.)

The consensus of respondents in general was that officers in charge were committed to minimizing malpractice, that being relieved of duty was likely if one was caught committing malpractice, and that the way quotas were met was more important than meeting the quotas. However, on the last issue, many recruiters felt the emphasis was on meeting quotas rather than on how they were met. (See pp. 18 to 19.)

Few respondents felt that awareness of malpractice extended beyond recruiters, and most believed the likelihood of detecting malpractice was low. (See p. 18.) Most respondents rated those enlistees entering the services under dubious circumstances as equally qualified to other recruits. (See pp. 19 and 20.)

POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The respondents were asked to evaluate the likely success of specific corrective actions.

The most frequently endorsed corrective action was reducing or eliminating unnecessary recruiter administrative and processing responsibilities. (See pp. 20 to 21.)

RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS

The written comments of recruiting personnel concerned such things as

--the need to return to a draft,

--the impact of pressure to meet quotas,

--a questioning of the need for various enlistment standards and requirements, and

--the negative effect of recruiting duty on a recruiter's financial status and family life. (See p. 23.)

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of perceptions of the survey respondents, malpractice is still a problem in every service component, except the Air National Guard. The types of problems and the extent varied by service component, but there were some predominant trends. Respondents identified pressure placed on recruiters to meet difficult quotas as being the cause of much of the malpractice; they suggested that changes in enlistment standards and administration and processing responsibilities could help correct current problems.

GAO believes respondents' views may provide useful insights into the extent and causes of recruiting malpractices that can be used to reduce malpractice. Further, GAO believes this information can be used as a baseline to measure improvements over time.

GAO has shared its analyses and detailed results with the services so they can use the information for these purposes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
(1) use the results of our work to assess ac-
tions the services have taken to correct re-
cruiting malpractice, (2) direct the services
to periodically measure, on an anonymous basis,
the incidents and causes of recruiting malprac-
tice, using our current data base as a baseline,
and (3) use the survey results in making over-
sight reviews.

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At Senator Nunn's request, GAO did not obtain
official comments from the Department of Defense.

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CHARTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AFEES   Armed Forces Entrance and Examination
              Stations

ASVAB/ACB   Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
              Battery/Army Classification Battery

GAO   General Accounting Office

GS   General Schedule

NCO   Noncommissioned officer

NCOICs   Noncommissioned officers in-charge

RINCs   Recruiters in-charge

MEPCOM   Military Enlistment Processing Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of the draft in 1973 marked the beginning of a new
and difficult era for the Armed Forces' recruiting programs. To
supplement the influx of volunteers, the services were forced to
compete against each other, civilian employers, and educational
institutions for the dwindling number of youths with sought-after
educational achievements or skills. As various public reports
have documented, many of the results have been less than satis-
factory, particularly for the Army, and to a lesser degree for
the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

The services have been under constant pressure to meet as-
signed recruiting quotas. Some recruiters have failed to meet
their periodic goals or quotas; others have succeeded, but only
by resorting to malpractice.

What is an unacceptable level of malpractice? There is no
clear-cut answer. Purists would argue that every one of the
young men and women enlisting in the Armed Forces be a legitimate
enlistee. Others might become concerned only after there are in-
dications that malpractice is more than just isolated cases of
individual recruiters' padding their enlistment records--when it
becomes more of a shared, systemic practice.

The services' and the Congress' concerns about malpractice
go beyond insuring an honest program. They are more concerned
about the potential adverse impact on national security of enlist-
ing those who have failed to meet service-determined entry re-
quirements. If carried to the extreme, the consequences could be
very serious. Insights into the levels of malpractice which
prompt congressional concern can be gained by examining the rec-
ords of two recent congressional hearings. The first malprac-
tice investigation in late 1978 involved the Marine Corps and was
prompted by several complaining recruiters and media reports.
Although the investigation concluded that there was no widespread
recruiting malpractice, the Marine Corps reported during the hear-
ing that it had investigated 1,835 malpractice allegations in the
previous 2-year period. Of these, 351 were confirmed. During
this time, the Marine Corps enlisted about 85,000 non-prior-service
males, and the 351 cases represented less than one-half of 1 per-
cent of the total.

The second major malpractice investigation involved the Army
and took place during 1979. Prompted by media reports of malprac-
tice and indications, from test scores patterns, of unauthorized
coaching for the Armed Forces Qualification Test, the Army made a
massive investigation of malpractice actions. Several investigat-
ing teams were formed, and all recruits and recruiters thought to
be involved in malpractice were interviewed. Consequently, about

320 recruiting personnel were implicated. About 12,500 persons were identified as having been improperly enlisted, under 6 percent of the 230,000 or so the Army enlisted during the review period.

To lessen malpractice opportunities, the services have instituted numerous procedures and safeguards. Nevertheless, Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, was concerned about whether the services' actions have been sufficient and whether an unacceptable level of malpractice continued to exist. In a recent report 1/ to the Subcommittee, we discussed many of the corrective actions taken by the services. This report is concerned with the extent and nature of malpractice as seen by those most directly involved in recruiting. The findings reported here represent a summary of more-detailed analyses that we conducted. The detailed results have been provided to the services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Subcommittee to allow a more indepth study.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Our major objective was to obtain the views of recruiting personnel on the

  --nature and extent of malpractice,

  --causes of that malpractice, and

  --possible corrective actions.

In addition, we obtained information which would allow certain characteristics and perceptions of current Army recruiting personnel to be compared with those implicated in the recent internal Army malpractice investigation. (See app. V.)

We reviewed recruiting practices in each of the four military services, and, in the cases of the Army and the Air Force, we extended our review to the Reserve and National Guard components. We obtained views from persons at three organizational levels: commanding officers, junior officers/enlisted supervisors, and enlisted recruiting personnel. 2/ In addition, we obtained information from current and former Army recruiting personnel who had been implicated in the recent malpractice investigation.

1/"Recruiting Management in the Armed Services" (FPCD-80-78, Aug. 15, 1980).

2/In those groups where there were few personnel who could respond, only two levels were surveyed in order to protect confidentiality.

The findings presented here are based on a questionnaire mailed in mid-1980 to 4,401 individuals who represented 25 separate groups within the military recruiting structure. Information on the sample sizes and response rates is in appendix II along with a more-detailed description of our methodology. Appendix III presents the approximate confidence intervals for all respondent groups at the 95-percent level of statistical confidence.

For the purposes of our survey, recruiting malpractice and irregularities are defined as doing something which is prohibited, or not doing something which is required, by law; by service regulations, policies, or directives; or by common sense. Our definition included the element of intent to improve an applicant's chances of either entering military service or qualifying for desired training programs or bonuses. These actions could involve recruiters, their supervisors, and/or personnel at the Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES). (The complete definition is contained in app. I.)

Respondents were asked to estimate the frequency of malpractice on a 7-point scale, ranging from "never (0 percent)" to "often (34 percent or more)." An additional response option of "cannot make a judgement" was included. However, generally less than 5 percent chose this last option.

The analysis of malpractice presented in chapter 2 highlights only those questions on which a relatively high percentage of respondents estimated that malpractice occurred more than 2 percent of the time. We believe that, ideally, no recruiting malpractice should occur. However, we have chosen to discount the seriousness of responses of "almost never (1%-2%)," since 2 percent represents a more realistic target that the services should strive for. This is a subjective judgment; arguments were advanced for both higher and lower levels. In our view, however, it is a reasonable compromise between the two extreme views and represents a level of malpractice which merits congressional concern. As an additional conservative procedure, we combined answers of "cannot make a judgement" with those of "never (0%)" and "almost never (1%-2%)" rather than deleting them entirely. This further minimized the percent estimating malpractice to exceed the desirable level.

In many cases the responses within a particular service varied considerably as a function of organization level. To the extent that substantial numbers of any respondent group indicated more than 2 percent of a particular type of malpractice, we considered it sufficiently important to report on.

We asked respondents how sure they were about their estimates of the extent of malpractice. The answer to our question had four alternatives--very certain, fairly certain, somewhat certain, and not at all certain. Most participants indicated being

very certain or fairly certain about their answers. The combined percentages in these two categories ranged from 68 percent to 98 percent among the 25 groups surveyed.

CHAPTER 2

NATURE AND EXTENT OF MALPRACTICE

Recruiting personnel in the four services were asked about the overall extent of malpractice within their service, as well as the frequency of 25 specific types of malpractice. The specific types of malpractice involved such areas as

- --background information (i.e., inadequate verification of high school graduation),

- --police or arrest problems (i.e., incorrect recording of police or arrest record),

- --drug use (i.e., counseling to downplay or deny drug usage),

- --medical problems (i.e., overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for medical problems),

- --testing (i.e., providing applicants with answers to questions before the test), and

- --misleading applicants (i.e., about conditions of service or benefits).

The greatest extent of overall malpractice was reported in the Marine Corps, the lowest in the Air Force. Active duty respondents generally reported more overall malpractice than those in the Reserves or the National Guard. Officers and enlisted supervisors indicated greater overall incidence levels than recruiters. Most of the estimates exceeding 2 percent fell into the categories of "very seldom (3%-5%)" and "once in a while (6%-10%)" rather than in categories indicating higher frequencies. (See app. IV-A.) This latter finding was also generally true concerning the estimates of the specific types of malpractice.

The services varied on the specific types of malpractice found to be most problematic. The remainder of this chapter discusses malpractice in each service. 1/

1/For comparison, we performed the analysis reported here using a criterion of more than 5 percent malpractice, rather than 2 percent. The only major differences were that fewer respondents in general estimated that level of malpractice, and the Marine Corps no longer had the highest estimated rate. (See app. VII.)

MARINE CORPS MALPRACTICE

Three groups of Marine Corps personnel participated in our study. The percentages of each estimating the overall malpractice level to exceed 2 percent were commanding officers, 42 percent; enlisted supervisors, 29 percent; and recruiters, 33 percent.

The following six specific types of malpractice were estimated to be most prevalent within the Marine Corps:

--Inadequate or improper verification of high school graduation.

--Counseling to downplay the seriousness of, or to deny, police or arrest record.

--Counseling to downplay the seriousness of, or to not report, medical problems.

--Misleading applicants about conditions of service or benefits.

--Misleading applicants about which assignments or schools are available or for which they are qualified.

--Incorrect recording of the number school years completed (for non-high-school graduates).

More than a third of at least one Marine Corps group perceived each of these to be occurring in excess of 2 percent of the time. Chart 1 presents the findings regarding each of these types of malpractice for all Marine respondent groups.

Several other types of malpractice reported to be occurring with sufficient frequency to be of concern, although to a lesser extent than the six already discussed, were:

--Incorrect recording of police or arrest record.

--Overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for police or arrest record.

--No verification of police or arrest record.

--Counseling to downplay or deny drug usage.

--Providing applicants with answers to Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery/Army Classification Battery (ASVAB/ACB) questions before the test.

CHART 1

Percent of Marine Corps Respondents Estimating Greater
Than 2 Percent Incidence of Malpractice

District and Station Commanders	NCOICs (note a)	Recruiters
42%	36%	19%

GRADUATION VERIFICATION

District and Station Commanders	NCOICs	Recruiters
42%	36%	28%

POLICE RECORD COUNSELING

District and Station Commanders	NCOICs	Recruiters
42%	28%	29%

MEDICAL PROBLEM COUNSELING

a Noncommissioned officers in charge.

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CHART 1 (continued)

36%

21%

24%

District
and
Station
Commanders

NCOICs

Recruiters

MISLEADING ABOUT
CONDITIONS OR BENEFITS

38%

28%

24%

District
and
Station
Commanders

NCOICs

Recruiters

MISLEADING ABOUT
ASSIGNMENTS OR SCHOOLS

34%

36%

19%

District
and
Station
Commanders

NCOICs

Recruiters

INCORRECT YEARS
OF SCHOOL RECORDING

--Improper coaching or tutoring on subjects or questions re-
lated to ASVAB/ACB subtests.

--Incorrect recording of disqualifying medical problems.

--Incorrect recording of drug-usage information.

In each case, between 24 percent and 33 percent of at least one
of the three Marine respondent groups estimated malpractice to
exceed our 2 percent criterion.

ARMY MALPRACTICE

Nine separate Army groups were studied. One group consisted
of personnel implicated in the Army's internal malpractice inves-
tigation. That group's responses are discussed separately in ap-
pendix V.

Recruiting for both the Active and Reserve components is
conducted within the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. The command
is divided into geographical regions, and the regions are subdi-
vided into districts. The districts are further divided into
areas. Senior officers in command of the regions and districts
formed one of our Army respondent groups, while the junior offi-
cers in charge of the areas formed another. Three separate groups
of recruiters surveyed were active duty military recruiters, ci-
vilian (GS-7) personnel who recruit for the Army Reserve, and mil-
itary reservists who also recruit for the Army Reserve. Within
the Army National Guard, we surveyed recruiting and retention
managers, who were officers who managed Guard recruiting at the
State level, as well as enlisted supervisors and recruiters.

All the Active Army groups reported similar overall levels
of malpractice above 2 percent (24%-30%). Comparable figures for
the Reserve recruiters were 18 percent and 23 percent. In the
Army National Guard, the percentages estimating overall malprac-
tice to exceed 2 percent were commanding officers, 6 percent;
enlisted supervisors, 19 percent; and recruiters, 21 percent.

The type of malpractice receiving the highest mention by
Army respondents was misleading of applicants about conditions of
service or benefits. Forty-one percent of the Active commanding
officers and 38 percent of the junior officers estimated this was
occurring more than 2 percent of the time. Chart 2 shows the
findings regarding this type of malpractice for the other Army
respondents.

Several other types of recruiting malpractice were reported
at relatively high rates by at least one Army respondent group:

--Counseling to downplay seriousness of, or to deny, police
or arrest record.

CHART 2

Percent of Army Respondents Estimating Greater Than 2 Percent Incidence
of Malpractice Involving Misleading Applicants About Conditions of Service or Benefits

	ACTIVE			RESERVE			GUARD	
Region and District Commanders	Area Commanders	Recruiters	GS-7 Recruiters (note a)	Military Recruiters	Recruiting and Retention Managers	Enlisted Supervisors	Recruiters
41%	38%	26%	21%	18%	29%	11%	10%

a/General Schedule.

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--Overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for police or arrest record.

--Counseling to downplay seriousness of, or to not report, medical problems.

--No verification of police or arrest record.

--Counseling to downplay or deny drug usage.

--Misleading applicants about assignments or schools available for which they are qualified.

--Incorrect recording of police or arrest record.

--Inadequate or improper verification of high school graduation.

The highest estimates of malpractice incidences exceeding 2 percent for these ranged from 26 percent (inadequate or improper verification of high school graduation) to 34 percent (counseling to downplay the seriousness of, or to deny, a police or arrest record).

NAVY MALPRACTICE

In addition to Navy recruiters and their commanding officers, three groups of supervisory personnel completed our survey. These were zone supervisors, recruiters in charge, and A Station commanders. Zone supervisors are senior enlisted personnel responsible for recruiters at several recruiting sites. Recruiters in charge are enlisted personnel in charge of individual recruiting stations. 1/ A Station commanders are junior commissioned officers and warrant officers in charge of those recruiting stations which also serve as a Navy liaison with the AFEES and have some waiver authority.

The percentages in these groups estimating overall malpractice to exceed 2 percent ranged from 20 percent to 25 percent in all Navy groups other than the recruiters in charge, of whom only 14 percent felt this way.

Counseling to downplay or deny drug usage was the type of malpractice with the highest estimated incidence in the Navy for A Station commanders, commanding officers, and recruiters.

1/There are two kinds of Navy recruiters in charge: one kind has a personal recruiting quota, the other does not. We combined those with quotas with the Navy recruiter group and considered only those without quotas as recruiters in charge.

Chart 3 indicates the percent of the various Navy respondent groups estimating more than 2 percent of this type of malpractice.

Several other types of malpractice were estimated to occur with sufficient frequency, by at least one Navy respondent group, to merit mention:

--Incorrect recording of police or arrest record.

--No verification of police or arrest record.

--Misleading applicants about conditions of service or benefits.

--Counseling to downplay seriousness of, or to deny, police or arrest record.

--Counseling to downplay the seriousness of, or not report, medical problems.

--Incorrect recording of drug usage information.

--Overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for police or arrest record.

--Overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for drug usage.

--Misleading applicants about assignments or schools available for which they are qualified.

--Inadequate or improper verification of high school graduation.

--Incorrect recording of the number of school years completed by non-high-school graduates.

For each of these types of malpractice (except the last two), between 42 percent and 53 percent of A Station commanders indicated a level of malpractice in excess of 2 percent. Furthermore, between 28 percent and 41 percent of at least one other Navy respondent group estimated each of these types of malpractice to exceed 2 percent.

AIR FORCE MALPRACTICE

Four groups were surveyed in the Active Air Force. In addition to commanding officers and recruiters, two enlisted supervisor groups were studied. These were flight supervisors, responsible for recruiters at several locations, and operations superintendents, with more general responsibilities in the Air Force recruiting program. Our survey covered enlisted supervisors and recruiters in both the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.

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CHART 3

Percent of Navy Respondents Estimating Greater Than 2 Percent Incidence
of Malpractice Involving Counseling to Downplay or Deny Drug Usage

45%	63%	27%	24%	25%
Area and District Commanders	A Station Commanders	Zone Supervisors	Recruiters-in-charge	Recruiters

Estimates of overall malpractice for these groups were low. In the Active Air Force the percentages estimating a greater than 2 percent occurrence were

--commanding officers, 6 percent;

--operations superintendents, 17 percent;

--flight supervisors, 8 percent; and

--recruiters, 12 percent.

Comparable results in the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard were

--reserve supervisors, 8 percent;

--reserve recruiters, 15 percent;

--guard supervisors, 2 percent; and

--guard recruiters, 9 percent.

Within the Air Force, the two specific types of malpractice estimated to occur most often were

--overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for police or arrest records and

--no verification of police or arrest record.

Each of these were estimated to occur more than 2 percent of the time by a third of the operations superintendents. The former was also estimated to occur more than 2 percent of the time by 32 percent of the Air Force Reserve supervisors.

Although not estimated to occur beyond tolerable limits by quite as many as the foregoing two, four other types of malpractice were reported by Air Force respondents at unacceptable levels:

--Misleading applicants about which assignments or schools are available or for which they are qualified.

--Overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for drug usage.

--Misleading applicants about conditions of service or benefits.

--Counseling to downplay the seriousness of, or not report, medical problems.

From 22 percent to 29 percent of the operations superintendents believed incidences of these types of malpractice exceeded 2 percent. Additionally, counseling to downplay the seriousness of, or not report, medical problems drew the greatest estimates (exceeding 2 percent) from both Active (23 percent) and Reserve (24 percent) Air Force recruiters.

Recent changes

Our survey also asked for a comparison of malpractice levels during the "past 3 months" with the situation during "all of 1979." Far more respondents in each service indicated that malpractice had decreased or stayed the same than increased. For example, among Army active duty recruiters, only 3 percent reported an increase in malpractice, while 38 percent indicated a decrease and 35 percent responded that the level of malpractice remained the same. The remaining 24 percent said they had not been in the area long enough to make a comparison. Answers to this question for each respondent group are shown on appendix IV-B.

This finding is consistent with the recent efforts by the services to reduce malpractice described in our earlier report on recruiting management. Yet, many perceive that malpractice is occurring more than 2 percent of the time, indicating that the situation still needs attention.

SUMMARY

Analysis of perceived recruiting malpractice levels indicates potential problems in every component, except the Air National Guard. Such problems are most notable in the Marine Corps and to a somewhat lesser extent in the Army and Navy, while being of a far lesser nature in the Air Force. For 15 of the 25 specific types of malpractice studied, our findings raise concern in at least one component. These findings are summarized in chart 4. The major problem areas appear to involve misleading of applicants, police and arrest problems, drug use, and medical problems. Malpractice involving background information and especially testing may not be as severe.

The lack of findings involving testing, especially in the Army, suggests that service efforts dealing with such malpractice have been effective. This also may account for the reported reduction in overall malpractice cited in the previous section. We believe, however, that malpractice in nontesting areas may be of sufficient magnitude to warrant service attention.

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CHART 4

Components in Which Specific Types of
Malpractice May Be a Problem

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Army National Guard	Air National Guard	Air Force Reserve
Misleading applicants:							
Misleading applicants about conditions of service or benefits	X	X	X	X	X		
Misleading applicants about which asssignments or schools are available or for which they are qualified	X	X	X	X			
Police or arrest problems:							
Counseling to downplay seriousness of, or to deny, police or arrest record	X	X	X				
No verification of police or arrest record	X	X	X	X	X		
Incorrect recording of police or arrest record	X	X	X				
Overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for police or arrest records	X	X	X	X			X
Drug use:							
Counseling to downplay or deny drug usage	X	X	X				
Incorrect recording of drug usage information		X	X				
Overly sympathetic judgment on waivers for drug usage			X	X			X
Medical problems:							
Counseling to downplay seriousness of, or not report, medical problems	X	X	X	X			X
Incorrect recording of disqualifying medical problems			X				X
Background information:							
Inadequate or improper verification of high school graduation	X	X	X				
Incorrect recording of number of school years completed (for non-high-school graduates)		X	X				
Testing:							
Providing applicants with answers to ASVAB/ACB questions before the test				X			
Improper coaching or tutoring on subjects or questions related to ASVAB/ACB subtests				X			

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CHAPTER 3

REASONS FOR MALPRACTICE AND

POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Our survey included several questions related to the reasons for the occurrence of recruiting malpractice. We asked

--how often specific reasons were involved,

--the extent to which various individuals in the chain of command were aware of malpractice,

--what is the command level attitude toward malpractice,

--how easy is it to get away with malpractice, and

--whether recruits entering as a result of malpractice were relatively poor performers.

We also obtained respondents' evaluations of potential corrective actions for reducing the incidence of malpractice. About half of the respondents provided supplemental information in written form.

The most frequently mentioned specific reason for malpractice in all services was the difficulty in attempting to meet assigned quotas. Most respondents believed that officers in charge were totally committed to minimizing malpractice and that, if caught, a malpracticing recruiter would be removed from duty. However, many respondents felt that their service was more concerned with meeting quotas than with the means used. Furthermore, few respondents thought there was a high probability of malpractice being detected, and most believed that awareness of malpractice was limited to applicants and recruiters. Also, relatively few believed that recruits entering the service as a result of malpractice presented any problems in terms of being poor performers.

The potential corrective action receiving by far the greatest endorsement involved reducing or eliminating recruiter administrative and processing responsibilities. Many of the written comments stated that the respondent was unaware of, or not involved with, any incidences of malpractice. Other comments concerned

--the need to return to a draft,

--the impact of pressure to meet quotas,

--a questioning of the need for various standards and requirements, and

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--the negative impact of recruiting duty on a recruiter's financial status and family life.

REASONS FOR MALPRACTICE

Respondents were asked how often the following reasons apply in situations in which recruiters were either involved in or aware of malpractice and did not report it:

--Desire to help applicants.

--Trying to meet difficult quotas or goals.

--Desire to win awards or promotions.

--Encouragement from supervisors.

--Peer pressure.

Answers were recorded on a 5-point scale ranging from "never" to "always," along with the option to check "cannot make a judgement." Our analysis of these reasons focused on the percentages selecting answers of "often" or "always." Complete results are presented in appendix IV-C, which shows that "trying to meet difficult quotas/goals" was the most frequently mentioned reason for malpractice. In those cases where it was not (Active Army and Army National Guard commanding officers as well as Air Force commanding officers, operations superintendents, and Air Guard enlisted supervisors and recruiters), "desire to help applicant" was the reason most frequently cited.

Command level attitudes

Three questions were used to probe perceptions of the organizational attitude toward malpractice. The first asked how committed to minimizing malpractice were officers in charge. The second asked how likely it was that individuals involved in malpractice would be removed if supervisory personnel became aware of their actions. The final question asked whether the respondents thought supervisors were concerned more with meeting goals than with how the goals were were being met.

Concerning the first question, a majority of those in every respondent group said that officers in charge of recruiting were totally committed to minimizing malpractice. More officers and supervisors held this view than recruiters. For example, in the Marine Corps, the comparable results were 84 percent for commanding officers and 68 percent for recruiters.

On the issue of what would be done to malpracticing recruiters if their supervisors found out, a majority in almost

every group expected they would definitely be removed. Again the size of the majority was related to rank, with officers and enlisted supervisors more likely to say "definitely" than recruiters.

The percentage agreeing with the statement that "in my service there is more concern with making goals or quotas than with how it is done" was higher among recruiters than officers and enlisted supervisors. For example, while only 8 percent of Marine Corps commanders agreed with this statement, 34 percent of its recruiters agreed. The GS-7 Army Reserve recruiters showed the strongest concurrence (51 percent).

Chain-of-command awareness

Respondents were asked the extent to which various people knew about unreported malpractice incidents. A 5-point response scale was used with options ranging from "never" to "always," with an additional "cannot make a judgement" category.

Our analysis focused on the percentage answering "often" or "always." (See app. IV-D.) Highest awareness is generally attributed to recruiters and applicants. With few exceptions, the percentage of respondents indicating that others were "often" or "always" aware was below 20 percent. These findings require great caution in their interpretation since between 25 percent and 50 percent of many respondent groups indicated that they could not make a judgment on these questions.

Probability of detection

To the extent it is considered difficult to commit malpractice without being detected, a deterrent effect would be expected. We asked for an estimate of the chances that a hypothetical act of malpractice would be discovered by enlisted supervisors, personnel at the entrance and examination stations, or commanding officers. An estimate of 80 percent or greater was considered a high probability of detection. Complete results can be found on appendix IV-E.

In general, few people believed that there was a high probability of detection. For example, less than one-third of the respondents in the Army, Marine Corps, and Army Guard believed there was a high probability of detection. Furthermore, fewer recruiters than supervisors or commanders typically believed the detection probability to be high.

Quality of recruits entering
due to malpractice

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought recrui' entering the service as a result of malpractice performed

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as well as other recruits in (1) training and job performance, (2) avoiding discipline problems, and (3) completing their initial enlistment period. Possible answers were: "worse," "about the same," "better," and "don't know." Recruiting personnel who believe that such recruits actually perform as well or better might be less likely to eschew malpractice.

The results differed by organization level and by service. In all of the groups containing recruiters, a higher percentage felt that recruits entering as a result of malpractice would do at least as well as other recruits than felt that they would do worse. For example, 37 percent of Marine Corps recruiters answered "about the same" or "better" for these recruits compared to only 11 percent who said "worse."

For enlisted supervisors, similar results were obtained in the cases of the Marine Corps, Navy (recruiters in charge), Air Force (operations superintendents), and Air Force Reserve. For the other enlisted supervisor respondent groups, as many or more answered "worse" than "better" or "about the same." In the Army, Air Force, and Navy (A Stations), more commanding officers felt recruits entering under improper circumstances did "better" or "about the same" than did "worse," while the opposite was true for the remaining commanding officer groups.

Evaluation of potential corrective actions

Respondents were presented with 14 corrective actions and asked to indicate how much each would serve to reduce current malpractice levels. A 5-point response scale was used which ranged from "not at all" to "a great deal," along with an additional answer of "cannot make a judgement." The percent answering "pretty much" or "a great deal" was used as an index of the corrective potential of these actions. See appendix IV-F for a complete display of the answers to this question.

The action receiving the greatest endorsement was the one proposing to reduce or eliminate unnecessary recruiter administrative and processing responsibilities. This action was felt to have the highest potential for reducing malpractice by all, except two, respondent groups. Reaction to the other actions varied by component. Chart 5 indicates which actions received the most positive responses. Several of the proposed actions were perceived to contribute to reducing malpractice.

Respondents' comments

Written comments were provided by about half of those responding to our questionnaire.

CHART 5

Components in Which Specific Corrective Actions May Be Most Appropriate (note a)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Army National Guard	Air National Guard	Air Force Reserve
Better selection of production recruiters	X	X	X		X	X	X
Better selection of supervisory personnel	X	X	X		X	X	X
Improve training for production recruiters	X	X			X		X
Improve training for supervisory personnel	X	X	X		X		
A small increase (about 10%) in the number of production recruiters	X						
A large increase (about 25%) in the number of production recruiters							
Increase numbers of support personnel	X				X		
Increase day-to-day supervision over recruiting					X	X	
Increase or introduce additional checks, audits, or reviews			X				
Limit the time a production recruiter is assigned to a single location to 2 years		X	X				
Improve support (more timely leads, more detailed demographic data, etc.)	X		X		X		X
Reduce emphasis on competition among recruiters (recruiter of the month, year, etc.)	X		X		X		X
Reduce or eliminate unnecessary recruiter administrative/processing responsibilities	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Evaluate recruiters on the basis of recruit survival/performance during first term as well as number enlisted	X	X	X		X	X	X

a/"X" indicates over 40 percent in at least one respondent group answered "pretty much" or "a great deal."

Many comments indicated that no malpractice was occurring. Other comments described problems with the current system or provided suggestions to improve recruiting. The general nature to these comments and some representative quotations from Active recruiters are presented below. The results of an analysis of the comments provided by officers and enlisted supervisors, Army and Air Force Reserve and Guard recruiters, and those implicated in the Army's malpractice investigation can be found in appendix VI.

Return to a draft--Many said that the All-Volunteer Force could not succeed and that the draft should be reinstituted. Some cited a lack of patriotism, while others pointed to the lack of competent youths emerging from our educational institutions. One said malpractice was necessary because what the Army has to offer the volunteer is really "not a good product."

Pressure to meet quotas--A second frequently encountered theme described a system in which the severe consequences of failure lead to malpractice. Comments included:

> "Malpractice is caused by pressures on recruiters
> for production."

> "If we don't make quota, we get fined, busted and
> our military careers are ruined."

One described Navy recruiters as "basically honest" people who "get involved in irregularities for survival." Another expressed the dilemma succinctly with the view that you were "damned if you do, damned if you don't."

Further comments on the ways in which this pressure is applied from higher officials follow:

> "Irregularities stem from the officers and staff
> people. They do not actually say 'cheat' but they
> do say things that imply or can easily be inferred
> to mean cheat."

One quoted a supervisor as stating the following during a difficult recruiting period:

> "If it breathes, talks and can walk through the
> door, put it in."

And finally on this general theme:

> "When a professional has to sacrifice or jeopardize
> his integrity and professionalism to accomplish his
> mission, it's not the soldier but the mission that
> should be scrutinized."

Questioning of standards—Another major theme was that many of the current enlistment standards are overly strict or altogether unnecessary. Standards mentioned included both medical and educational. The following comments were typical.

"Medical standards are archaic."

"Enlistment standards don't appear to match with today's society."

"We should look at what we waiver and reduce it; medical most of all."

"If I tried to enlist today, I couldn't because I lack enough education."

"All enlistment standards should be reevaluated."

Negative impact of recruiting duty—The final major theme noted in the comments detailed the financial and personal hardships caused by recruiting duty. Many wrote of the problems caused by the high cost of living when residing in areas not near military bases. Others complained about being forced to use personal vehicles on recruiting duty without compensation. Still others cited the family problems caused by the long hours they were forced to work to meet quotas and the lack of vacations:

"Recruiting duty should be limited to single men."

"Length of tours need to be cut back to 2 years."

"Need a mid-term break from production pressure."

One summed up his thoughts with the following:

"Recruiting duty is about the worst duty a career man can have."

SUMMARY

This chapter describes the environment in which military recruiting is conducted. In many cases, survey results revealed perceptions that may allow for or even encourage the malpractice reported in the previous chapter. Thus, while most believe there is an official commitment to minimize malpractice, many recruiters believe that meeting quotas is more important than how these quotas are met. While most expect that a recruiter will be relieved if found to be engaged in malpractice, few believed that the risk of being caught is high. Additionally, few respondents see any harm to their service in terms of the quality of those enlisted as a result of malpractice. This may be related to those comments questioning various standards and requirements.

While few believe that awareness of specific instances of malpractice extends above the recruiter level, the comments indicate that many perceive a definite yet usually subtle message from supervisors that recruiters are expected to do whatever is necessary to meet their goals.

The perceived impact of quotas on malpractice is clear, their being rated as the most frequent cause and most often cited in respondents' comments.

Although some respondents feel a return to the draft is necessary, many believe that far less drastic actions have the potential to substantially reduce malpractice. Most promising among these actions are those related to reducing or eliminating unnecessary administrative and processing responsibilities.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of survey respondents' perceptions, malpractice is still a potential problem in every service component, except the Air National Guard. The types of problems and the extent varied by service component, but there were some predominant trends. Respondents identified pressure placed on recruiters to meet difficult quotas as being the cause of much of the malpractice; they suggested that changes in enlistment standards and in administration and processing responsibilities could help correct current problems. We believe respondents' views can provide useful insights into the extent and causes of recruiting malpractices that can be used in reducing malpractice. Also, this information can be used as a baseline for measuring improvements over time. We have shared our analyses and detailed results with the services so they can use the information for these purposes.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

1. Use the results of our work to assess actions the services have taken to correct recruiting malpractice.

2. Direct the services to periodically measure, on an anonymous basis, the incidents and causes of recruiting malpractice, using our current data base as a baseline.

3. Use the survey results in making future oversight reviews.

Military Recruiter Survey

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT BUSINESS

15. Listed below are descriptions of various types of recruiting irregularities or malpractice. Select the answer which best expresses your belief about the extent to which each occurs in your service within the geographical region or organizational unit that you are assigned (e.g., Army - recruiting area, Navy - zone, Air Force - flight, Marine Corps - station, Guard - state). Consider the past 3 months only. Your answers should be based on direct knowledge or information obtained from what you consider to be reliable sources.

For the purposes of this questionnaire, recruiting irregularities or instances of malpractice are defined as:

- doing something which is prohibited by law; Service regulations, policies, or directives; or common sense

- not doing something which is required by law; Service regulations, policies, or directives; or common sense

Irregularities or malpractice involve 1 or more of the following:

- Recruiters

- Enlisted supervisors

(See note below.) - MEPCOM personnel assigned to AFEES or other enlistment processing personnel

- Recruiting personnel assigned to AFEES

- Officers in charge of recruiting

Instances defined as irregularities or malpractice occur with the intent of either:

- improving an applicant's chances of entering military service, or

- improving the applicant's chances of qualifying for desired training programs or bonuses

Irregularities and malpractice do not include unintentional clerical mistakes or other unintentional errors.

NATURE OF IRREGULARITY OR MALPRACTICE (Check one for each item.)	Never (0%)	Almost never (1%-2%)	Very seldom (1%-5%)	Once in a while (6%-10%)	Occasionally (11%-20%)	Sometimes (21%-33%)	Often (34%, or more)	Cannot make a judgement
BACKGROUND INFORMATION	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
a. Inadequate or improper verification of age	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. Inadequate or improper verification of social security number	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. Inadequate or improper verification of parental approval (for applicants under age 18)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d. Inadequate or improper verification of high school graduation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e. Forging or altering high school diploma	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f. Incorrect recording of years of school completed (For non-high school graduates)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
g. Other irregularities involving background information	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	

(specify)

Note: Military Enlistment Processing Command.

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NATURE OF IRREGULARITY OR MALPRACTICE
(Check one for each item.)

Column headers (diagonal): Never (0%) | Almost never (1%-2%) | Very seldom (3%-5%) | Once in a while (6%-10%) | Occasionally (11%-20%) | Sometimes (21%-33%) | Often (34% or more) | Cannot make a judgement

POLICE/ARREST PROBLEMS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
h. Counseling to "downplay" seriousness or to deny police/arrest record	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
i. No verification of police/arrest record	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
j. Incorrect recording of police/arrest record	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
k. Overly sympathetic judgements on waivers for police/arrest record	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
l. Improper arrangements with police officials regarding enlistment of individuals who would otherwise be subject to arrest or imprisonment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
m. Improper arrangements with court or parole officials regarding enlistment of individuals who would otherwise remain in custody or on parole	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
n. Other irregularities involving police/arrest problems		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

_____
(specify)

Column headers (diagonal): Never (0%) | Almost never (1%-2%) | Very seldom (3%-5%) | Once in a while (6%-10%) | Occasionally (11%-20%) | Sometimes (21%-33%) | Often (34% or more) | Cannot make a judgement

DRUG USE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
o. Counseling to "downplay" or deny drug usage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
p. Incorrect recording of drug usage information	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
q. Overly sympathetic judgements on waivers for drug usage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
r. Other irregularities involving drug use		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

_____
(specify)

NATURE OF IRREGULARITY OR MALPRACTICE
(Check one for each item.)

	Never (0%)	Almost never (1%-2%)	Very seldom (3%-5%)	Once in a while (6%-10%)	Occasionally (11%-20%)	Sometimes (21%-33%)	Often (34% or more)	Cannot make a judgement
MEDICAL PROBLEMS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
s. Counseling to "downplay" seriousness or not report medical problems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
t. Incorrect recording of disqualifying medical problems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
u. Overly sympathetic judgements on waivers for medical problems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
v. Other irregularities involving medical problems		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

_____
(specify)

	Never (0%)	Almost never (1%-2%)	Very seldom (3%-5%)	Once in a while (6%-10%)	Occasionally (11%-20%)	Sometimes (21%-33%)	Often (34% or more)	Cannot make a judgement
TESTING	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
w. Providing applicants with answers to ASVAB/ACB questions before the test	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
x. Improper coaching or tutoring on subjects or questions related to ASVAB/ACB subtests	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
y. Assistance during ASVAB/ACB test administration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
z. Use of 'ringers" (substitute test takers)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
aa. Changing or incorrectly scoring ASVAB/ACB test results	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
bb. Other irregularities involving testing		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

_____
(specify)

	Never (0%)	Almost never (1%-2%)	Very seldom (3%-5%)	Once in a while (6%-10%)	Occasionally (11%-20%)	Sometimes (21%-33%)	Often (34% or more)	Cannot make a judgement
OTHER	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
cc. Misleading applicants about conditions of service or benefits	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
dd. Misleading applicants about which assignments or schools are available or for which they are qualified	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The project was conducted using standard survey research techniques. The initial set of questions intended for this project was reviewed by subject matter experts in each military component selected for study, as well as by GAO staff familiar with the subject matter and specialists in questionnaire design. The questions were modified on the basis of comments from these groups. The new set of questions was subjected to extensive pretesting in which recruiting personnel from all services participated.

Pretests consisted of having individuals complete the draft questionnaire followed by our holding discussions with them, either individually or in small groups, to answer their questions on questionnaire items. Pretesting was especially critical in this study because of the lack of previous data collection on the subject and the extremely sensitive nature of the information being requested. The questionnaire was again modified following the pretests and resubmitted to the military components' subject matter experts for final comments. After receipt of these comments, the final drafts of our survey were prepared and reproduced for distribution.

Each survey consisted of a series of questions dealing with perceptions of overall and 25 specific types of recruiting malpractice, possible causes of malpractice, potential corrective actions, and demographic and attitudinal variables thought to be related.

The three forms were essentially the same, the major difference being the frame of reference for the question concerning the frequency of occurrence of specific types of malpractice. In the officer and enlisted supervisor forms, frequency estimates are requested at the service level while the military recruiter survey obtains these estimates at a lower organizational level.

Potential respondents were selected in one of two ways. Either all members of a group were selected for participation or a sufficiently large random sample was selected to produce an acceptably low sampling error at the 95-percent confidence level. Approximate sampling errors for our survey results are shown as appendix III. For the survey of officers, all those in 6 of 7 groups were selected, while a sample of the Army area commanders was selected.

For the survey of enlisted supervisors, all those in six of the eight groups were selected. Samples were taken of Navy zone supervisors and Air Force flight supervisors. Samples of active duty recruiting personnel in each of the four branches and those in the Air Force and Army Reserve and Guard were taken to select recipients of the Military Recruiter Survey.

In addition to these study groups, the Military Recruiter Study was sent to all individuals listed by the Army as having been implicated in its recent malpractice investigations. This group included those who had been relieved of recruiting duty as well as those who were pending departure and those whose cases were pending review. These respondents were instructed to answer the survey questions relative to their last 3 months of recruiting duty.

We mailed questionnaires to selected individuals in June 1980. At our request, the services provided us with names and addresses. In addition to containing the survey, each mailout package contained (1) a letter from our office requesting participation and promising confidentiality and (2) a memorandum of endorsement signed by a high-ranking officer in the appropriate recruiting command. A second mailout was sent to those who did not respond by early August.

This report presents the responses of those who returned a completed questionnaire by September 23, 1980. The table on the following page shows the number of questionnaires initially sent out; those deleted due to bad addresses, transfers, etc.; the number returned; and the response rate for each of the major respondent groups we studied. Very high response rates were obtained: 95 percent for the 7 groups receiving the Survey of Officers and for the 8 groups receiving the Survey of Enlisted Supervisors and 88 percent for the 10 groups receiving the Military Recruiter Survey.

TABLE II-1

SAMPLE SIZES AND RETURN RATES

Service	Respondent group	Initial sample	Number deleted	Adjusted sample	Number returned	Response rate
Army	Region and district commanders	62	2	60	59	98.3%
	Area commanders	126	4	122	113	92.6
	Active military recruiters	572	110	442	389	88.0
	Reserve military recruiters	286	41	245	211	86.1
	Reserve recruiters, GS-7	152	22	130	108	83.1
	Recruiters implicated in Army investigation	321	84	237	153	64.6
Army National Guard	Recruiting and retention managers	52	–	52	49	94.2
	Enlisted supervisors	132	2	130	123	94.6
	Recruiters	463	18	445	375	84.3
Navy	Area and district commanders	49	2	47	47	100.0
	A Station commanders	21	–	21	19	90.5
	Zone supervisors	98	5	93	86	92.5
	Recruiters in charge (RINCs) (off production)	83	4	79	78	98.7
	Recruiters	467	32	435	415	95.4
Marine Corps	District and station commanders	53	–	53	50	94.3
	NCOICs (off production)	34	3	31	31	100.0
	Recruiters	493	65	428	397	92.8
Air Force	Group and squadron commanders	37	–	37	37	100.0
	Operations superintendents	31	3	28	24	85.7
	Flight supervisors	96	6	90	87	96.7
	Active recruiters	477	24	453	410	90.5
	Reserve supervisors	24	–	24	24	100.0
	Reserve recruiters	100	3	97	89	91.8
Air National Guard	Enlisted supervisors	48	–	48	45	93.8
	Recruiters	144	6	138	127	92.0

APPROXIMATE CONFIDENCE INTERVALS (±X%) AT THE

95-PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL FOR PROJECTING RESPONSES

OF MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS

The confidence intervals shown on the following page indicate the precision with which our sample estimates can be projected to the various respondent universes assuming that our respondents are representative of the group from which they were selected. For example, if 50 percent of our Active Army recruiters responded in a particular way, then we are 95 percent certain that between 45.2 percent and 54.8 percent (i.e., + 4.8%) of all Active Army recruiters would have responded that way. Confidence intervals for percentages not listed can be interpolated.

Entries of N/A (not applicable) refer to situations in which responses were obtained from all group members and for which there is therefore no uncertainty.

	For sample responses of:		
Respondent group	5 percent or 95 percent	20 percent or 30 percent	50 percent
Army:			
Region and district commanders	0.8	1.4	1.7
Area commanders	3.0	5.5	6.8
Active military recruiters	2.1	3.8	4.8
Reserve military recruiters	2.6	4.7	5.8
Reserve recruiters, GS-7	3.2	5.8	7.3
Personnel implicated in investigation	2.1	3.8	4.8
Army National Guard:			
Recruiting and retention managers	1.5	2.8	3.4
Enlisted supervisors	0.9	1.7	2.1
Recruiters	1.9	3.4	4.3
Navy:			
Area and district commanders	N/A	N/A	N/A
A Station commanders	3.1	5.7	7.2
Zone supervisors	3.4	6.2	7.8
Recruiters in charge (not on production)	0.6	1.1	1.3
Recruiters	2.0	3.6	4.4
Marine Corps:			
District and station commanders	1.5	2.7	3.4
NCOICs (not on production)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Recruiters	2.0	3.6	4.4
Air Force:			
Group and squadron commanders	N/A	N/A	N/A
Operations superintendents	3.4	6.2	7.7
Flight supervisors	3.3	6.1	7.6
Recruiters	1.9	3.4	4.3
Air Force Reserve:			
Enlisted supervisors	N/A	N/A	N/A
Recruiters	3.4	6.2	7.7
Air National Guard:			
Enlisted supervisors	1.7	3.0	3.7
Recruiters	2.8	5.2	6.5

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ESTIMATE OF OVERALL EXTENT OF RECRUITING MALPRACTICE
AND IRREGULARITIES

	Cannot make a judgment	Never (0%)	Almost never (1%-2%)	Very seldom (3%-5%)	Once in a while (6%-10%)	Occasionally (11%-20%)	Sometimes (21%-33%)	Often (34% or more)
Army:								
Region and district commanders	0.0%	8.5%	67.8%	15.3%	8.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Area commanders	0.9	15.3	56.8	21.6	4.5	0.9	0.0	0.0
Active military recruiters	8.0	34.4	28.1	13.9	5.5	5.4	1.9	2.9
Reserves recruiters, GS-7	9.0	36.8	30.9	11.0	6.8	2.8	2.6	0.0
Reserve military recruiters	11.5	40.3	29.8	8.1	5.4	2.2	2.3	0.4
Personnel in Army investigation	8.6	25.2	13.9	7.3	5.3	11.9	6.0	21.9
Navy:								
District and area commanders	2.1	4.3	70.2	21.3	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
A Station commanders	0.0	5.3	73.7	10.5	10.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zone supervisors	1.2	29.4	44.7	21.2	2.4	1.2	0.0	0.0
RINCs (off production)	2.6	46.2	37.2	7.7	3.8	2.6	0.0	0.0
Recruiting personnel	5.8	33.0	41.7	12.3	3.2	2.7	0.7	0.7
Air Force:								
Squadron and group commanders	2.8	16.7	75.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Operations superintendents	0.0	20.8	62.5	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Flight supervisors	3.4	33.3	55.2	6.9	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Recruiting personnel	4.7	39.1	44.1	7.4	2.5	1.2	0.5	0.5
Marine Corps:								
Station and district commanders	4.0	8.0	46.0	34.0	6.0	0.0	2.0	0.0
NCOICs (off production)	3.6	25.0	42.9	17.9	7.1	0.0	0.0	3.6
Recruiting personnel	4.0	29.5	33.7	15.9	7.3	4.8	3.8	1.0
Army National Guard:								
Recruiting and retention managers	0.0	19.1	74.5	6.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Enlisted supervisors	0.0	35.5	45.5	13.2	3.3	1.7	0.0	0.8
Recruiting personnel	5.9	38.9	34.6	11.1	4.3	3.0	0.8	1.4
Air National Guard:								
Enlisted supervisors	0.0	62.2	35.6	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Recruiting personnel	3.1	59.1	29.1	3.9	2.4	0.8	1.6	0.0
Air Force Reserve:								
NCOICs (off production)	4.2	37.5	50.0	4.2	0.	4.2	0.0	0.0
Recruiting personnel	4.5	41.8	38.5	8.1	2.3	1.2	2.4	1.1

COMPARISON OF CURRENT LEVELS OF RECRUITING MALPRACTICE
AND IRREGULARITIES WITH THE SITUATION IN 1979

| | IRREGULARITIES HAVE | | | | | Not been in this |
	Increased a lot	Increased some	Stayed about the same	Decreased some	Decreased a lot	area long enough to compare
Army:						
Region and district commanders	0.0%	0.0%	20.7%	10.3%	43.1%	25.9%
Area commanders	0.9	1.9	15.1	18.9	24.5	38.7
Active military recruiters	0.3	2.3	34.6	13.9	24.6	24.3
Reserves recruiters, GS-7	0.0	0.0	32.0	16.8	26.1	25.2
Reserve military recruiters	0.5	2.0	25.8	12.8	29.3	29.6
Personnel in Army investigation	3.0	4.4	46.7	19.3	19.3	7.4
Navy:						
Area and district commanders	0.0	0.0	13.3	28.9	40.0	17.8
A Station commanders	0.0	0.0	5.3	26.3	31.6	36.8
Zone supervisors	1.2	1.2	32.1	18.5	37.0	9.9
RINCs (off production)	0.0	1.5	41.8	7.5	34.3	14.9
Recruiting personnel	0.2	2.1	31.1	12.0	17.5	37.0
Air Force:						
Group and squadron commanders	0.0	0.0	58.6	24.3	5.4	13.5
Operations superintendents	0.0	0.0	70.8	16.7	12.5	0.0
Flight supervisors	1.2	1.2	70.7	12.2	9.8	4.9
Recruiting personnel	0.8	1.0	43.9	8.1	7.3	38.9
Marine Corps:						
District and station commanders	0.0	2.0	16.0	30.0	34.0	18.0
NCOICs (off production)	0.0	0.0	25.9	29.6	40.7	3.7
Recruiting personnel	0.8	2.2	21.5	14.3	25.1	36.0
Army National Guard:						
Recruiting and retention managers	0.0	0.0	37.8	20.0	17.8	24.4
Enlisted supervisors	0.9	3.5	31.3	18.3	41.7	4.3
Recruiting personnel	0.9	3.4	36.3	13.1	18.9	27.4
Air National Guard:						
Enlisted supervisors	0.0	2.6	78.9	5.3	13.2	0.0
Recruiting personnel	0.8	2.5	66.1	3.4	8.5	18.6
Air Force Reserve:						
NCOICs (off production)	0.0	5.0	65.0	15.0	15.0	0.0
Recruiting personnel	0.0	1.4	42.1	15.6	9.2	31.7

REASONS INVOLVED OFTEN OR ALWAYS WHEN RECRUITING
MALPRACTICE AND IRREGULARITIES OCCUR

	Desire to help applicants	Trying to meet difficult quotas/goals	Desire to win awards or promotions	Encouragement from supervisors	Peer pressure
Army:					
Region and district commanders	37.3	33.9	25.4	0.0	15.5
Area commanders	20.1	41.3	17.6	2.8	12.0
Active military recruiters	15.7	40.4	17.2	5.6	12.7
Reserve recruiters, GS-7	12.7	39.9	28.6	7.7	17.4
Reserve military recruiters	14.0	35.7	16.9	5.7	14.5
Personnel in Army investigation	34.8	59.4	25.0	36.1	32.2
Navy:					
Area and district commanders	21.3	29.8	6.4	0.0	0.0
A Station commanders	21.1	52.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zone supervisors	11.0	38.6	12.0	2.4	4.8
RINCs (off production)	19.5	23.0	6.4	3.9	5.2
Recruiting personnel	19.7	36.1	7.9	4.3	8.5
Air Force:					
Group and squadron commanders	30.6	16.7	2.8	2.8	5.6
Operations superintendents	8.7	8.6	8.7	0.0	0.0
Flight supervisors	12.9	24.4	9.4	0.0	9.4
Recruiting personnel	15.5	24.7	9.1	1.9	4.3
Marine Corps:					
District and station commanders	25.0	49.0	14.3	2.0	6.1
NCOICs (off production)	16.2	45.2	9.7	3.2	6.5
Recruiting personnel	18.8	43.1	11.8	5.2	11.2
Army National Guard:					
Recruiting and retention managers	24.5	11.1	4.4	2.2	4.5
Enlisted supervisors	11.1	23.8	5.1	1.8	6.1
Recruiting personnel	13.5	26.4	10.2	8.0	13.8
Air National Guard:					
Enlisted supervisors	11.7	11.6	4.7	0.0	2.4
Recruiting personnel	11.4	7.3	6.5	2.4	2.4
Air Force Reserve:					
NCOICs (off production)	8.7	21.7	8.6	4.3	0.0
Recruiting personnel	10.7	22.1	18.5	1.2	17.6

PERCENT ATTRIBUTING AWARENESS OFTEN OR ALWAYS TO VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS

	Applicants	Recruiters	Supervisory NCOs	Recruiting personnel at AFEES	MEPCOM personnel assigned to AFEES or other enlistment processing personnel	Officers in charge of recruiting
Army:						
Region and district commanders	38.6	44.9	12.3	8.8	3.6	5.3
Area commanders	36.0	43.1	15.6	7.3	4.7	7.3
Active military recruiters	19.6	29.9	12.9	9.3	4.0	9.8
Reserve recruiters, GS-7	19.8	29.3	15.3	5.5	4.2	7.9
Reserve military recruiters	17.3	23.6	11.5	6.2	4.2	7.5
Personnel in Army investigation	25.2	55.6	39.4	24.6	20.5	38.3
Navy:						
Area and district commanders	23.4	25.5	8.6	4.2	2.1	4.3
A Station commanders	31.6	26.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Zone supervisors	29.9	34.2	8.8	7.6	6.5	8.8
RINCs (off production)	34.2	23.3	5.6	7.0	4.3	8.4
Recruiting personnel	18.5	28.3	14.6	9.9	6.4	10.1
Air Force:						
Group and squadron commanders	25.0	22.3	8.4	5.6	2.8	2.9
Operations superintendents	20.8	20.8	20.9	13.0	13.0	8.3
Flight supervisors	30.2	20.4	14.3	10.8	6.0	14.7
Recruiting personnel	19.2	29.7	14.5	15.5	9.8	10.2
Marine Corps:						
District and station commanders	40.8	51.0	16.3	8.2	0.0	8.2
NCOICs (off production)	50.0	26.9	15.4	3.8	7.6	7.6
Recruiting personnel	27.0	40.8	20.2	12.5	8.3	11.1
Army National Guard:						
Recruiting and retention managers	26.1	30.4	13.0	6.7	4.5	10.8
Enlisted supervisors	22.5	25.9	15.1	8.5	1.8	10.3
Recruiting personnel	14.2	28.2	16.7	7.9	6.3	10.6
Air National Guard:						
Enlisted supervisors	21.0	46.2	30.7	14.7	11.7	24.3
Recruiting personnel	12.1	30.5	17.4	3.8	4.7	9.7
Air Force Reserve:						
NCOICs (off production)	28.5	23.8	9.6	4.8	0.0	4.8
Recruiting personnel	8.2	37.5	22.6	15.9	13.1	17.3

PERCENT REPORTING 80 PERCENT OR GREATER PROBABILITY
OF MALPRACTICE DETECTION

	Supervisory NCOs	MEPCOM personnel	Recruiting personnel at AFEES	Officers in charge of recruiting
Army:				
Region and district commanders	28.1	18.9	29.9	14.3
Area commanders	17.6	6.5	10.1	1.9
Active military recruiters	11.2	7.9	12.7	5.1
Reserve recruiters, GS-7	11.7	6.8	7.3	1.2
Reserve military recruiters	10.8	7.5	11.8	10.7
Personnel in Army investigation	7.8	6.2	6.0	6.3
Navy:				
Area and district commanders	34.7	19.5	43.4	28.2
A Station commanders	38.9	16.7	53.0	36.9
Zone suppervisors	25.7	19.0	28.8	21.5
RINCs (off production)	21.6	14.9	20.0	15.6
Recruiting personnel	16.0	11.2	15.1	12.5
Air Force:				
Group and squadron commanders	34.3	41.7	52.8	22.9
Operations Superintendents	33.4	29.4	55.0	10.6
Flight supervisors	18.2	21.7	30.0	11.4
Recruiting personnel	12.2	13.4	20.3	7.1
Marine Corps:				
District and station commanders	20.4	12.5	28.6	19.2
NCOICs (off production)	22.7	14.2	17.6	15.4
Recruiting personnel	16.7	8.3	13.6	10.5
Army National Guard:				
Recruiting and retention managers	32.0	19.1	16.4	23.9
Enlisted supervisors	20.0	14.8	15.1	15.6
Recruiting personnel	14.4	14.2	11.3	11.8
Air National Guard:				
Enlisted supervisors	52.4	12.5	9.9	34.2
Recruiting personnel	35.4	13.6	8.9	23.0
Air Force Reserve:				
NCOICs (off production)	47.8	15.0	4.8	10.0
Recruiting personnel	24.9	15.0	15.2	13.0

UTILITY OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
(Percent responding)
("Pretty Much" or "A Great Deal")

	Better selection of production recruiters	Better selection of supervisory personnel	Improve training for production recruiters	Improve training for supervisory personnel	A small increase (about 10%) in the number of production recruiters	A large increase (about 25%) in the number of production recruiters	Increase numbers of support personnel	Increase day-to-day super-vision over recruiting	Increase or introduce addi-tional checks, audits, or reviews	Limit the time a production recruiter is assigned to a single location to 2 years	Improve support (more timely leads, more detailed demo data, etc.)	Reduce emphasis on competi-tion among recruiter, (in-cruiter of the month, year, etc.)	Reduce or eliminate unneces-sary recruiter administra-tive/processing responsibil-ities.	Evaluate recruiter based on survival/performance during term as well as number
Army														
Region and district commanders	32.7	33.3	30.2	37.0	17.3	17.6	30.8	28.3	9.6	5.9	25.9	5.7	47.4	24.0
Area commanders	34.8	24.2	42.4	50.0	6.7	14.6	22.3	28.6	9.8	14.3	30.0	17.6	57.9	25.7
Active military recruiters	23.6	35.7	25.1	40.2	17.2	21.5	29.6	7.0	13.2	19.9	44.9	27.9	71.0	29.9
Reserve recruiters, GS-7	37.2	60.8	43.6	55.2	17.8	24.1	26.0	11.2	10.9	26.1	61.7	56.0	68.4	44.3
Reserve military recruiters	31.6	42.4	36.8	40.8	9.6	22.2	40.6	7.3	9.8	16.2	54.1	40.0	65.0	26.8
Personnel in Army investigation	12.6	32.3	21.1	25.5	14.0	30.8	22.9	9.2	18.9	15.6	39.6	40.2	78.2	25.8
Navy														
Area and district commanders	40.5	34.1	29.5	31.8	9.8	12.2	36.4	23.3	16.3	2.4	25.0	4.5	54.8	26.8
A Station commanders	27.8	33.3	22.2	33.3	16.7	38.9	33.3	33.3	27.8	0.0	38.9	11.1	57.1	29.4
Zone supervisors	38.2	41.8	43.9	43.9	14.0	17.5	26.3	25.0	14.3	8.8	31.6	17.9	78.3	24.6
RINCs (off production)	33.3	41.0	38.8	40.5	13.5	16.7	26.3	15.0	15.8	5.1	31.6	17.9	62.5	37.8
Recruiting personnel	23.9	32.1	27.0	28.9	9.6	15.3	22.1	4.9	7.0	13.4	30.7	29.4	72.0	26.4
Air Force														
Group and squadron commanders	22.2	21.4	28.6	25.0	11.5	18.5	10.7	25.0	7.4	0.0	25.0	17.9	27.3	11.5
Operations superintendents	33.3	29.4	33.3	33.3	17.6	25.0	11.8	16.7	5.6	5.6	23.5	22.2	50.0	16.7
Flight supervisors	26.4	22.6	22.6	20.8	10.0	15.7	7.7	5.8	5.7	9.4	30.2	28.3	55.6	25.5
Recruiting personnel	14.6	16.6	26.8	23.2	16.3	28.3	10.8	5.1	7.8	13.6	30.5	26.2	63.2	26.4
Marine Corps														
District and station commanders	29.5	37.2	34.1	45.5	4.8	4.7	27.3	29.5	11.6	12.5	18.2	6.8	29.6	37.2
NCOICs (off production)	45.0	50.0	30.0	55.0	33.3	33.3	25.0	40.0	31.6	45.0	50.0	20.0	68.8	16.7
Recruiting personnel	33.8	34.4	28.5	37.6	15.0	19.7	23.6	10.1	16.3	46.0	52.6	23.0	59.6	37.1
Army National Guard														
Recruiting and retention managers	52.8	45.7	48.6	47.2	25.7	38.2	44.4	48.6	13.5	2.7	33.3	11.1	32.1	41.2
Enlisted supervisors	34.7	28.0	44.7	38.7	20.3	27.5	33.8	24.7	18.7	6.7	47.4	13.3	50.7	31.1
Recruiting personnel	29.6	35.6	36.9	39.2	24.2	29.9	42.4	17.8	17.9	4.1	52.9	36.2	62.9	40.4
Air National Guard														
Enlisted supervisors	41.2	47.1	37.5	37.5	12.5	18.8	69.0	11.8	11.8	0.0	23.5	29.4	73.3	35.3
Recruiting personnel	31.9	37.5	29.2	31.3	2.1	6.3	37.5	4.2	6.3	0.0	36.2	33.3	71.4	41.3
Air Force Reserve														
NCOICs (off production)	33.3	50.0	42.9	42.9	38.5	30.8	23.1	21.4	14.3	7.7	53.8	64.3	75.0	50.0
Recruiting personnel	37.5	57.0	41.7	52.1	18.2	18.9	39.5	13.6	22.1	9.4	56.3	46.2	81.8	43.2

COMPARISON OF ARMY RECRUITING PERSONNEL IMPLICATED IN

ARMY INVESTIGATION AND CURRENT ARMY RECRUITERS

NATURE AND EXTENT OF MALPRACTICE

Compared to current Army recruiting personnel, those impli-
cated in the Army's malpractice investigation reported higher
levels of overall malpractice and each of the 25 specific types.
In addition, a higher percentage of respondents from the latter
group estimated the highest incidence levels. For example, with
regard to overall malpractice, 52 percent of the implicated per-
sonnel estimated incidence exceeding 2 percent compared to 30 per-
cent of current Army recruiting personnel. Also, 22 percent of
the implicated personnel estimated malpractice to occur 34 per-
cent or more of the time, while only 3 percent of the current
Army recruiting personnel did so. See appendix IV-A for further
details on this question.

These differences are consistent with the report by current
Army recruiting personnel (discussed in ch. 2) indicating that,
compared to 1979, malpractice has decreased.

CAUSES OF MALPRACTICE

Similar to the responses of current Army recruiting person-
nel, implicated recruiters cited difficult quotas as the most fre-
quent reason for malpractice. However, those identified in the
Army investigations attributed relatively more importance to en-
couragement from supervisors and less to the desire to win awards
and promotions than did current recruiting personnel. (See
app. IV-C.)

Implicated personnel attributed relatively more awareness to
those in other organization levels, particularly supervisory NCOs
and officers in charge of recruiting. (See app. IV-D.) Their es-
timates of the likelihood of detection were about the same (see
app. IV-E) as made by current Army recruiters.

On the questions about command attitude toward malpractice,
implicated personnel responded quite differently from current
Army recruiting personnel. The percent responding that officers
in charge are totally committed to minimizing malpractice was
only 25 percent compared to 57 percent, while the percent believ-
ing that malpracticing recruiters would definitely be removed if
detected was only 36 percent compared to 55 percent. Two-thirds
of the implicated respondents believed there was more concern with
meeting quotas than with how the quotas were met compared to only
39 percent of current Army recruiting personnel.

Respondents' attitudes toward the quality of recruits enter-
ing under malpractice also differed considerably. Implicated

recruiting personnel (60%), much more so than current Army re-
cruiting personnel (35%), thought such recruits did as well as or
better than others, while only 6 percent compared to 16 percent
believed they did worse.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Reducing or eliminating unnecessary recruiter administrative
and processing responsibilities was by far the most highly recom-
mended corrective action by the implicated personnel, 70 percent
saying this would reduce malpractice pretty much or a great deal.
Next to this action, reducing emphasis on competition among re-
cruiters (37 percent) and improving support (34 percent) received
relatively high levels of endorsement. The answers of current
Army recruiters were similar with respect to administrative and
processing responsibilities and improving support, but reducing
competition was viewed as more effective by the implicated per-
sonnel.

OTHER COMPARISONS

Our questionnaire also obtained a variety of additional per-
sonal and organizational data on which Army recruiting personnel
could be compared. On some of these, there were wide differences
between current recruiters and those implicated in the Army in-
vestigations, while on others no differences were found.

As a group, those implicated in the Army investigations had
served longer in terms of total military service, time in their
last recruiting office, and total months as recruiters. Compared
to current recruiters, more had been assigned to their last of-
fice for longer than 2 years (47% vs. 21%), more had between 12
and 20 years of service (60% vs. 40%), and fewer were in paygrades
E5 and E6 (43% vs. 60%) while more were E7s (53% vs. 31%). Also,
more reported having been a recruiter between 3 and 8 years (54%
vs. 24%) while fewer had served 2 years or less as recruiters
(14% vs. 43%). More reported assignments to two or three recruit-
ing offices (52% vs. 38%), while fewer had been assigned to a
single office (35% vs. 45%).

Concerning career intent, the number of production recruiters
assigned to the person's current office, and the recent quota per-
formance of the office, implicated recruiters did not differ.
However, on the question of the recent difficulty of meeting
quotas, more implicated recruiters said it was harder (36% vs.
29%) and fewer said it was easier (9% vs. 20%).

Another difference was found with respect to how much the re-
spondents liked recruiting duty compared to other military assign-
ments. More implicated personnel reported liking recruiting much
more (50% vs. 24%) and fewer reported liking it less (19% vs. 31%).

A final topic involved supervision. Fewer of those impli-
cated in the Army investigation (35% vs. 59%) reported that their
immediate supervisor was located at their recruiting office. In
those cases where the supervisor was not colocated, no differences
in mail, phone, or personal contact were noted.

No differences were found with respect to phone contact with
an individual's officer in charge; however, implicated personnel
differed on both mail and personnel contact with their officers
in charge. More reported four or more mail contacts (39% vs. 31%)
and fewer reported none (41% vs. 52%). Also, fewer reported four
or more personal contacts (51% vs. 68%).

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES

TO RECRUITING MALPRACTICE QUESTIONNAIRES

Chapter 3 included a summary of the answers made by Active recruiters to the final survey question soliciting general comments on the topic of military recruiting. This appendix supplements that summary by presenting the results of a more detailed content analysis performed on the responses of officers, enlisted supervisors, Reserve and Guard recruiters, and former recruiters implicated in the Army's internal malpractice investigation.

These results are described in two sections. The first section covers the overall findings for officers and enlisted supervisors. The second section discusses the answers of Reserve and Guard recruiters as well as those involved in the Army investigation.

OFFICERS AND ENLISTED SUPERVISORS

The most frequently occurring comment was that recruiters are basically honest and/or that the respondents were not aware of any malpractice. Overall, 33.8 percent gave an answer like this. In two respondent groups, considerably more individuals gave this answer as shown on table 1. These were Air Force group and squadron commanders (69.6%) and Air National Guard supervisors (63.0%). In contrast, only 7.7 percent of the Marine NCOICs answered in this manner.

Three other themes had relatively high overall responses. These involved supervision, quotas, and the personal difficulties affecting recruiters. Overall, 20.7 percent of the comments related to supervision. Such answers indicated that recruiting leaders need to be of high quality and require training. This theme was found most often in the answers of Air Force Reserve supervisors (46.2%).

Comments indicated that quotas caused too much pressure and were not realistic given the current size of the manpower pool and various local situations. The only groups to vary substantially from the overall rate (19.9%) on this theme were the Army Guard recruiting and retention managers (4.3%) and Air Force operations superintendents, none of whom gave an answer like this.

Overall, 15.9 percent of those making comments thought more emphasis on the personal needs of recruiters, such as pay and housing, was needed. This type of comment was given most often by Air Force operations superintendents (38.5%) and least often by Air National Guard supervisors (3.7%), Army Guard recruiting and retention managers (4.3%), and Marine NCOICs (0.0%).

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Table VI-1 shows the percent of respondents in each group whose answers followed themes receiving an overall response above 15 percent. Less frequently mentioned themes are listed below along with the overall response level and those groups deviating substantially.

1. Too much changing of regulations and qualifications, and stability and clarity are needed (10.3%).

2. Need more and better civilian support (9.0%).

3. Current system is good with appropriate checks and balances (8.5%).

    --Air Force group and squadron commanders (39.1%).

    --Air Force operations superintendents (38.5%).

4. Too much paperwork (8.3%).

5. Need a better product to offer recruits (8.1%).

6. Punishment for malpractice should be swift and harsh (8.1%).

    --Air Force group and squadron commanders (26.1%).

7. Need a draft or some type of Federal service (5.9%).

8. Need more advertising (5.5%).

TABLE VI-1

OFFICER AND ENLISTED SUPERVISOR COMMENTS

Respondent group	General theme			
	Recruiters are honest	Good supervision needed	Quotas too difficult	Recruiter hardships
Army:				
Area commanders (55)	18.2%	20.0%	20.0%	14.5%
Region and district commanders (29)	24.1	17.2	20.7	20.7
Guard recruiting and retention managers (23)	34.8	26.1	4.3	4.3
Guard supervisors (64)	28.1	29.7	28.1	10.9
Navy:				
Region, district, and A Station commanders (28)	35.7	14.3	21.4	21.4
Zone supervisors (52)	28.8	17.3	30.8	21.2
RINCs (42)	35.7	19.0	21.4	16.7
Marine Corps:				
District and station commanders (29)	37.9	17.2	10.3	20.7
NCOICs (13)	7.7	38.5	15.4	0.0
Air Force:				
Group and squadron commanders (23)	69.6	13.0	8.7	17.4
Operations superintendent (13)	46.2	23.1	0.0	38.5
Flight supervisors (47)	31.9	14.9	17.0	17.0
Reserve supervisors (13)	46.2	46.2	30.8	23.1
Guard supervisors (27)	63.0	14.8	18.5	3.7
Overall (458)	33.8	20.7	19.9	15.9

RECRUITERS

Three themes dominated the answers of Army and Air Force Reserve and Guard recruiters and those implicated in the Army investigation: (1) the difficulty of quotas (24.4%); (2) the need for more support (24.2%); and (3) the basic honesty of recruiters (23.8). Table 2 in this appendix presents the percentages of respondents in each group giving answers related to these themes.

Fewer Air National Guard recruiters (12.3%) mentioned quotas than did other respondents, while more (52.3%) described recruiters as honest. Fewer personnel in the Army investigation mentioned the honesty of recruiters (1.4%) and the need for more support (15.1%) compared to other respondent groups. Also, more Air Force Reserve recruiters (42.2%) and fewer GS-7 Army Reserve recruiters (1.9%) mentioned the honesty of recruiters, while more Air Force recruiters (33.3%) referred to quotas.

The only other theme with an overall response rate above 15 percent was the need for better selection of recruiters and supervisors (17.6%). As table 2 shows, there was no sizable variation among respondent groups concerning this theme.

Other themes drawing at least a 5-percent overall response are listed below, along with groups deviating substantially.

1. Change needed in testing and waivers procedures (11.8%).

   --Army Guard (21.2%).

   --Army Reserve GS-7 (3.8).

2. Recruiter hardships (11.6%).

   --Army Reserve military (22.1%).

   --Personnel implicated in Army investigation (4.1%).

3. More knowledgeable management support (10.0%).

   --Air National Guard (4.6%).

4. Displeasure with the nature of survey questions (9.8%).

   --Air National Guard (15.4%).

5. Better AFEES support (9.6%).

6. Conflicting and rapidly changing regulations (7.4%).

   --Army Reserve GS-7 (13.5%).

--Air National Guard (1.5%)

7. Need some type of draft (5.4%).

Additionally, 35.6 percent of the personnel implicated in the Army investigation indicated the belief that the U.S. Army Recruiting Command investigation was biased.

TABLE VI-2

RECRUITER COMMENTS

Respondent group	Quotas too difficult	More support needed	Recruiters are honest	Better selection needed
Army:				
Reserve military recruiters (95)	25.3%	26.3%	20.0%	11.6%
Reserve, GS-7 (52)	28.8	25.0	1.9	19.2
Investigation (73)	24.7	15.1	1.4	13.7
Guard (170)	24.7	26.5	26.5	22.4
Air Force:				
Reserve (45)	33.3	26.7	42.2	24.4
National Guard (65)	12.3	23.1	52.3	12.3
Overall (500)	24.4	24.2	23.8	17.6

SUPPLEMENTAL MALPRACTICE ANALYSES

The analysis in chapter 2 used a criterion of 2 percent as the maximum tolerable frequency of recruiting malpractice. Thus, only the responses of those indicating "very seldom (3%-5%)" or more often were viewed with concern. Although we believe this to be the most appropriate criterion for assessing the nature and extent of malpractice, we recognize that some persons may consider it too stringent. Therefore, we have also examined the data from the perspective of only those estimating malpractice to occur "once in a while (6%-10%)" or more often. Analysis results are summarized in the table on the following page.

The following points of comparison with the results in chapter 2 should be noted.

--Fewer than 20 percent of the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Army National Guard respondent groups saw any specific type of malpractice exceeding 5 percent.

--Using the 5-percent incidence criterion, 11 specific types of malpractice were reported by at least 20 percent of one or more respondent groups. Four additional types of malpractice are involved when a 2-percent criterion is used.

--All nine types of malpractice associated with the Navy, under the 5-percent criterion, result from the answers of A Station commanders only. In no other Navy respondent group did as many as 20 percent of the respondents estimate any type of malpractice to exceed 5 percent.

--The four types of malpractice attributed to the Marine Coprs under the 5-percent criterion result from the responses of commanding officers, enlisted supervisors, and recruiters.

--The two types of malpractice associated with the Army under the 5-percent criterion are the result of the answers of the area commanders.

TABLE VII-1

COMPONENTS IN WHICH 20 PERCENT OR MORE OF AT LEAST

ONE RESPONDENT GROUP ESTIMATED MALPRACTICE TO OCCUR

"ONCE IN A WHILE (6%-10%)" OR MORE OFTEN

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps
Misleading applicants:			
Misleading applicants about conditions of service or benefits	X	X	
Police or arrest problems:			
Counseling to downplay seriousness of, or deny, policy or arrest record		X	
No verification of policy or arrest record		X	X
Incorrect recording of police or arrest record		X	
Overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for policy or arrest record		X	X
Drug use:			
Counseling to downplay or deny drug usage		X	X
Incorrect recording of drug usage information		X	
Overly sympathetic judgments on waivers for drug problems		X	
Medical problems:			
Counseling to downplay seriousness of, or not report, medical problems			X
Background information:			
Incorrect recording of number of school years completed (for non-high-school graduates)			X
Testing:			
Improper coaching or tutoring on subjects or questions related to ASVAB/ACB subtests		X	

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